Abstract-Most of the research on the incentive mechanism design in crowdsourcing has focused on how to allocate sensing tasks to participants to maximize the social welfare. However, none of them consider the coverage holes created by the uneven distribution of participants. As a result, most of the participants in some popular areas compete for tasks, while many tasks in unpopular areas cannot be completed due to the lack of participants. In this paper, we design a movement-based incentive mechanism for crowdsourcing, where participants are stimulated to move to the unpopular areas and complete the sensing tasks in these areas, which benefits both participants and the platform. We formulate a task allocation problem considering controlled mobility. Since the task allocation problem is NP-hard, we propose a greedy algorithm to solve it and design a critical payment policy to guarantee that participants declare their cost truthfully. Theoretical analysis shows that our proposed incentive mechanism satisfies the desired properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, platform profitability, and computational efficiency. Evaluation results show that the proposed movement-based incentive mechanism outperforms the existing solution under various conditions.
providers, and the platform recruits them to provide sensed data. By leveraging crowdsourcing, people have designed new applications to achieve a wide variety of services [3] , [4] , such as healthcare [5] , environmental monitoring [6] , noise pollution monitoring [7] , 3-D modeling of the urban buildings [8] , and radio-frequency fingerprinting indoor location [9] .
The success of these crowdsensing applications critically depends on the participation of a large number of smartphone users. However, users may not be willing to participate, as participating in a mobile-sensing task will incur extra operational costs such as battery and computing power. In addition, users also expose themselves to potential privacy threats by sharing sensed data tagged with location and time. Considering previous problems, incentive mechanisms are needed to encourage the participation of smartphone users. Therefore, incentive mechanisms have attracted a lot of interests from both academia and industry [10] , [11] .
Some recent works have been devoted to the incentive mechanism design in crowdsourcing, using pricing or auction [12] [13] [14] . Most of these works focus on how to allocate the sensing tasks to participants to maximize the social welfare. However, none of them consider the coverage holes [15] , [16] created by the uneven distribution of participants. In practice, most of the participants are clustered in some popular areas, and many of them may lose in the auction. In contrast, many tasks in the unpopular areas cannot be completed due to the lack of participants.
For example, the 3-D modeling of a building in [8] requires complete angular coverage around the building's perimeter, with several photos taken from different angles. However, in practice, most participants are clustered in the popular areas such as the entrance or exit of the building [17] . To verify this, we crawled Flickr for photos of a library in our area. Fig. 1 shows the location of crawled Flickr photos denoted as stars and the location of photos required for 3-D modeling denoted as circles. As can be seen, the participants tend to be clustered in popular areas although the platform requires photos around the building for 3-D modeling. Another example is to build a noise pollution map of a city [7] , where the platform requires sensed data all over the city, but there may not be enough participants in some parts of the city.
For many crowdsourcing-based services such as the aforementioned examples, their effectiveness is a direct result of the sensing task coverage [18] . In order to enlarge the sensing task coverage, it is important to motivate the participants in popular areas to move to unpopular areas and complete the sensing tasks in these areas. In reality, there will be some cost (e.g., time, energy, dissatisfaction, etc.) for a user to move from one place to another. Therefore, an incentive is needed to encourage participants to move to the unpopular areas.
In [19] , Talasila et al. proposed a sensing-game-based incentive scheme to attract participants to move to unpopular areas. However, it is limited to gaming, and not for general application. In this paper, we design a general movement-based incentive mechanism for crowdsourcing applications, where participants are stimulated to move under the instructions from the platform so as to benefit both participants and the platform. We formulate a task allocation problem considering controlled mobility. Since the task allocation problem is NP-hard, we propose a greedy algorithm to solve it and design a critical payment policy to guarantee that participants declare their cost truthfully. Theoretical analysis shows that our proposed incentive mechanism, including the greedy algorithm and the critical payment policy, satisfies the desired properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, platform profitability, and computational efficiency. We also prove that the approximation ratio of the greedy algorithm is (1 − 1 e ). Evaluation results show that the proposed movement-based incentive mechanism outperforms the existing solution under various conditions.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows. 1) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design a general movement-based monetary incentive mechanism for crowdsourcing applications, where participants are stimulated to move under the instructions from the platform to benefit both participants and the platform. 2) Theoretical analysis shows that the proposed mechanism satisfies the desired properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, platform profitability, and computational efficiency. 3) Evaluation results show that the proposed movementbased incentive mechanism outperforms the existing solution in terms of the task completion ratio, the participant winning ratio, and the social welfare. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review the related work. Then, we present the system model and the problem formulation in Section III. In Section IV, we propose the movement-based incentive mechanism. Theoretical analysis of the proposed incentive mechanism is presented in Section V. We present the evaluation results in Section VI. Section VII concludes our work.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been lots of research on incentive in crowdsourcing, which can be generally divided into two categories. One category of the existing work encourages participation by nonmonetary incentives, such as the competitive game-based incentive [8] , [19] , [20] and the reputation-based incentive [21] . However, it is hard to use nonmonetary incentives to motivate participants to collect sensed data.
Another category of the existing work motivates participation by monetary incentives. In [13] , Lee and Hoh proposed the virtual participation credit to prevent participants from dropping out of the reverse auction, but they only analyzed the situation that participants applied for one sensing task. In [12] , Yang et al. considered two types of incentive mechanisms. They first proposed a Stackelberg game-based incentive mechanism for the platform-centric model and then proposed a reverse auction-based MSensing incentive mechanism for the user-centric model. The work in [22] and [23] investigated online incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsourced sensing. The work in [14] and [24] analyzed incentive mechanisms by considering the location information and coverage constraints. However, they did not consider the mobility of participants.
The work in [25] and [26] discussed user recruitment and task allocation by utilizing the mobility of participants. They relied on predicting participants' mobility, which may not be accurate. The work in [27] focused on task allocation to satisfy the time budget constraint for each participant by taking into account both the geographical characteristics of sensing tasks and the movement of mobile users. However, users may not follow the instructions of the platform to move without efficient incentive in practice. Moreover, none of them consider controlling the mobility of participants to enlarge the sensing task coverage. In this paper, we proposed the movement-based incentive mechanism, where the platform can leverage the movement-based incentive to motivate the participants in popular areas to move to unpopular areas and complete sensing tasks there to achieve enlarged sensing task coverage.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
We consider a crowdsourcing system consisting of a platform residing in the cloud and many participants, as shown in Fig. 2 . The platform accepts sensing requests from platform users and devises multiple sensing tasks based on the sensing requests. The platform publishes these sensing tasks to participants periodically. There are m sensing tasks, and the set of sensing tasks is denoted by T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t m }. A sensing task t j specifies the desired sensing service and the corresponding location where the sensed data should be collected. Let (x t j , y t j ) denote the location of sensing task t j and let ν j denote the value of sensing task t j to the platform. Similar to [12] , [14] , and [24] , we assume that each sensing task t j only needs to be completed by one participant, and participants are isolated and do not cooperate.
There are n participants in the crowdsourcing system and the set of participants is denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each participant i is aware of his own location (x 1 Let ψ i denote the capacity of participant i, which is the maximum number of sensing tasks participant i can complete due to the limited battery power and time budget. Similar to the existing work [14] , [24] , [27] , we assume that each participant shares his current location and capacity with the platform.
In order to enlarge the sensing task coverage, the platform motivates participants to move from popular areas to unpopular areas. There will be some cost (e.g., time, energy, dissatisfaction, etc.) for a participant to move from one place to another. We introduce a moving cost function g(d), which is a monotonically increasing function of moving distance d. The moving cost function is determined by the participant himself (his time, the remaining battery capacity, and various environmental and human factors). Due to the limited time of each participant, we assume that each participant has an upper bound of moving distance [28] , [29] . Once the distance to the destination is beyond the upper bound, the participant is not willing to move there. Fig. 3 shows an example of the moving cost function g(d) of a specific participant i, where δ i is the moving distance upper bound of participant i. The curve represents participant i's moving cost as the moving distance increases. For example, the moving costs are g 1 and g 2 with moving distances d 1 and d 2 . Similar to [30] and [31] , we model the moving cost function as g(d) = e η ·d − 1, where η determines the scale of g(d), and a smaller η results in lower moving cost. Participants have different value of η due to the difference of environmental and human factors. In the future, we will consider more practical moving cost functions and study how such cost function affects the incentive mechanism design.
In order to motivate participants to move from one place to another place, the platform should provide the movement-based incentive, which is relevant to the moving cost function. We define the movement-based incentive for a specific participant i as follows:
where η c i is in the critical bid of participant i described in Section IV-C. Participant i moves from his current location to his destination following the shortest path calculated based on the map [32] . The moving distance d i is the length of the shortest path. In practice, many sensing tasks are time dependent and have a specified deadline; a participant cannot complete the sensing tasks located far away from each other. Therefore, the platform motivates each participant to move to only one destination and complete sensing tasks there. The notations are listed in Table I .
We use a reverse auction framework to model the interactions between the platform and the participants. The participants act as sellers to send bids, which include the cost c i for completing one sensing task and the parameter η i in moving cost function. The platform then acts as the buyer to allocate sensing tasks to each participant and buy the sensed data from them. Fig. 2 illustrates the reverse auction between the platform and participants. First, the platform publishes the set of sensing tasks T to participants. Then, each participant i announces a bid b i = {c i , η i } to apply for sensing tasks. Upon receiving the set of bids from the n participants, B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n }, the platform allocates sensing tasks to participants and determines payment to each winning participant. Let S denote the task allocation result, and S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n }, where S i is the set of sensing tasks allocated to participant i. P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n } denotes the payment determination result where p i is the remuneration of participant i. If i wins, S i = φ and p i = 0. If i loses, S i = φ and p i = 0. Finally, each winning participant moves to the destination and completes its sensing tasks and sends the sensed data back to the platform. We define the payoff of the platform, the payoff of each participant i, and the social welfare as follows.
Definition 1: The payoff of the platform is the total value of sensing tasks completed by participants minus the total payment to the winning participants
where t j ∈S i ν j is the value of the sensing tasks completed by participant i, and p i is the payment to participant i. Definition 2: The payoff of each participant i is
where |S i | · c i is the cost for completing the set S i of sensing tasks, and
The social welfare is the difference between the total value of completed sensing tasks and the sensing cost
where
is the contribution that participant i makes to the social welfare by completing the set S i of sensing tasks. The social welfare is the sum of all participants' contributions. The social welfare is the aggregate of the platform's payoff and participants' payoffs, because the payment in the payoff of the platform and the payment in the payoffs of participants cancel each other from a social perspective.
B. Problem Formulation
The incentive mechanism consists of two components: task allocation and critical payment determination, which are formulated as follows.
Definition 4 (Task allocation problem): Find the task allocation
The objective of the task allocation problem is to maximize the social welfare. The first constraint indicates that the platform can motivate participant i to move distance 
A payment determination algorithm resulting from the critical payment determination problem can guarantee that participants declare their costs truthfully. Our objective is to design an incentive mechanism that solves the two problems defined above. This mechanism should also satisfy the following four desirable properties. 1) Truthfulness: An incentive mechanism is truthful, if and only if the winning participant selection is monotonic and the payment is critical. 2) Individual rationality: The payoff of each participant i is nonnegative, u i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. 3) Platform profitability: The payoff of the platform is nonnegative, u 0 ≥ 0. 4) Computational efficiency: The outcome can be solved in polynomial time.
IV. MOVEMENT-BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM
In this section, we propose our movement-based incentive mechanism consisting of the task allocation algorithm and the critical payment determination algorithm. First, we prove that the task allocation problem is NP-hard. Then, a greedy algorithm is proposed to solve the task allocation problem within polynomial time. Finally, a critical payment determination algorithm is proposed, which guarantees that each participant declares his cost truthfully.
A. Complexity Analysis of the Task Allocation Problem
In this section, we prove that the task allocation problem is NP-hard. Theorem 1: The task allocation problem is NP-hard. Proof: First, we simplify the task allocation problem to a special case INSTANCE A by assuming that each participant i has a fixed set S i of sensing tasks to complete. Then, we prove INSTANCE A is NP-hard by giving a polynomial time reduction from the NP-hard SET COVER problem. Finally, we relax the assumption and show that the task allocation problem is NP-hard.
where D i is the set of sensing tasks that participant i decides to complete. The universe set of sensing tasks is U = D i ∈D D i , and its size is m , where m ≤ m. We set the value of each sensing task equal to v . v is a constant, and v ≥ n. We assume that the cost for each participant i to move to his destination and complete the set D i of sensing tasks is
The question is whether there exists a subset
where w is the social welfare, and k is the size of D 0 .
SET COVER: A set C = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n }, where C i is the set of some elements in the universe set V = C i ∈C C i . The question is whether a subset C 0 ⊆ C of size k exists such that every element in V belongs to at least one member in C 0 .
We prove that there is a solution to INSTANCE A if and only if there is a solution to the SET COVER problem. We first prove the forward direction. Let D 0 be a solution to INSTANCE A, w ≥ v · m − k. Since k ≤ n ≤ v , the only possibility that we have such a social welfare is when the set D 0 covers all the sensing tasks [12] . Therefore, the corresponding set C 0 is a solution to the SET COVER problem. Next, we prove the backward direction. Let C 0 be a solution to the SET COVER instance. We can select the corresponding set D 0 as the solution to INSTANCE A.
Now, we relax the assumption, i.e., the platform can allocate different set S i of sensing tasks to each participant i. The set S is not fixed, and there are a finite number of possibilities. Each given S is corresponding to the set D in INSTANCE A, and it is NP-hard for the platform to choose a subset
Hence, the task allocation problem in (5) is also NP-hard.
B. Task Allocation Algorithm
To achieve the desired property of computational efficiency, a greedy algorithm is proposed to solve the task allocation problem. The idea is to pick the participant who can make the highest contribution to the social welfare, until the social welfare cannot benefit from the unselected participants.
Let B 0 denote the set of bids from the selected winning participants. Let S 0 denote the set of task allocation results of these winning participants, S 0 = {S 1 , S 2 , . . .}. Initially, B 0 = ∅ and S 0 = ∅. In each iteration, the platform selects the destination and finds the set of sensing tasks for each unselected participant i to maximize his contribution to the social welfare, denoted as set S i,B 0 . S i,B 0 is a subset of T 0 , where T 0 ← T \ S 0 . The contribution that participant i can make to the social welfare is
Then, the platform selects the participant who can make the highest contribution to the social welfare, until the social welfare cannot benefit from the unselected participants. In each iteration, B 0 and S 0 are updated, and deleted from the set B of bids and the set T of sensing tasks. The pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 1.
An Example: To further illustrate Algorithm 1, we give an example as shown in Fig. 4 . In this example, T = {t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 }, ν 1 = ν 2 = ν 3 = ν 4 = 10. Sensing tasks t 1 and t 2 locate in the unpopular area, sensing tasks t 3 Find the set of sensing tasks S i,B 0 ; 5:
end for
QUIT 10:
end if 11: 
C. Critical Payment Determination Algorithm
The payment determination should guarantee that each participant honestly reports his real cost. We propose the critical payment determination algorithm based on the critical payment. 
for all b x in B 1 do 4:
Find the set of sensing tasks S x,B 2 ; 5:
end for 7:
x = arg max b x ∈B 1 w(x, S x,B 2 ); 8: 
where S i is the task allocation result of participant i (S i ∈ S 0 ), The pseudocode of the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. In Algorithm 2, B 2 is the set of bids from the selected winning participants. S x,B 2 is the set of sensing tasks that the platform finds for each unselected participant x to maximize his contribution to the social welfare, after B 2 has been selected. S i,B 2 is the set of sensing tasks that the platform finds for participant i to maximize his contribution to the social welfare, after B 2 has been selected.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, through theoretical analysis, we demonstrate that the movement-based incentive mechanism satisfies the desired properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, platform profitability, and computational efficiency.
According to the theory about the truthfulness of incentive mechanism in [33] , the movement-based incentive mechanism is truthful if and only if it satisfies the following two conditions: 1) The winning participant selection in Algorithm 1 is monotonic; and 2) each winning participant is paid the critical payment. Before showing that the movement-based incentive mechanism satisfies the two conditions, we first define monotonicity and critical bid. Proof: The winning participant selection in Algorithm 1 is monotonic. The payment to each winning participant is critical. According to [33] , the movement-based incentive mechanism is truthful.
Theorem 3: The movement-based incentive mechanism satisfies the property of individual rationality.
Proof: If participant i loses, S i = ∅, p i = 0, and his payoff is 0. If participant i wins by declaring a bid b i , his payoff is
is the critical payment to participant i. Next, we show that u i is positive when participant i wins. Since participant i wins, his declared bid must be smaller than his critical bid. Then, for each winning participant i that truthfully reports his real cost, his payoff is
We prove that our mechanism satisfies the property of platform profitability by taking advantage of the submodularity of the platform's payoff u 0 . Next, we first define the submodular function.
Definition 8 (Submodular function): Let W be a finite set. A function f : 2 X → R is submodular if
for any P ⊆ Q ⊆ W and w ∈ W \ Q, where R is the set of reals.
Lemma 3:
The payoff u 0 of the platform and the social welfare w are submodular.
Proof: By Definition 8, we need to show
for any P ⊆ Q ⊆ B and b i ∈ B \ Q, and P and Q are the sets of bids from the winning participants.
, where S i,P and S i,Q are the sets of sensing tasks allocated to participant i after the platform has selected the set P of winning participants and the set Q of winning participants. Since P ⊆ Q, we have
. Therefore, the payoff u 0 of the platform is submodular. Similarly, we can also prove that the social welfare w is submodular.
Theorem 4: The movement-based incentive mechanism satisfies the property of platform profitability.
Proof: Lemma 4: The computation complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n 2 m log m). Proof: Since each winning participant should complete at least one new sensing task, and the while loop finishes when the unselected participants cannot make any contribution to the social welfare, the while loop is run at most n times. The complexity of the for loop is O(n). In each iteration of the for loop, the platform finds the set S i,B 0 of sensing tasks that participant i makes the highest contribution by completing them with complexity O(m log m). Finding the winning participant who can make the highest contribution takes O(n log n) times. Hence, the computation complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n 2 m log m).
Lemma 5:
The computation complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(n 2 m log m). Proof: The while loop is run at most n times. In each iteration of the while loop, there are three main processes. First, computing w(x, S x , B 2 ) of each participant x takes O(nm log m) times (in lines 3-6). Second, finding the participant who can make the highest contribution takes O(n log n) times (in line 7). Third, finding the set S i,B 2 of sensing tasks that participant i makes the highest contribution by completing them takes O(m log m) times (in line 9). Hence, the computation complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(n 2 m log m). Theorem 5: The movement-based incentive mechanism satisfies the property of computational efficiency.
Proof: Algorithm 1 for task allocation has polynomial-time computation complexity. Algorithm 2 for critical payment determination has polynomial-time computation complexity. The movement-based incentive mechanism satisfies the property of computational efficiency.
Theorem 6: Let w opt be the optimal value of the social welfare that can be achieved by any n participants. Let w greedy be the social welfare achieved by the Algorithm 1. Then
Proof: We assume that n is the number of winning participants in Algorithm 1. From Lemma 3, the social welfare is submodular. Based on the analysis of approximations for submodular functions in [34] , we have
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed movement-based incentive mechanism. Although there are many existing works in this area, none of them consider mobility control and most of them are based on the greedy algorithm. Yang et al. [12] proposed a typical greedy algorithm called MSensing incentive mechanism, where participants bid for the sensing tasks within their sensing range, and the platform greedily selects the participant with maximal social welfare contribution without considering mobility control. In this paper, we mainly compare our mechanism with MSensing.
A. Simulation Setup
In our simulations, we deploy a crowdsourcing application each participant is r = 20 m. The capacity of each participant is ψ = 2. We illustrate the simulation model in Fig. 5(a) . The value of each sensing task to the platform follows uniform distribution within [6, 10] . Participants set their cost of completing one sensing task according to uniform distribution within [3, 5] . We assume that the parameter η in the moving cost function is η = 0.03, and the moving distance upper bound is δ = 70 m.
The following three metrics are used for evaluating the performance of the incentive mechanisms.
1) Task completion ratio, the ratio of sensing tasks being completed by participants. 2) Participant winning ratio, the ratio of participants winning in auction. 3) Social welfare, the difference between the total value of the completed sensing tasks and the total sensing cost.
B. Simulation Results on Task Allocation
With our simulation setup, 400 sensing tasks are uniformly distributed across 100 grids. As a result, there are four sensing tasks in each grid. Fig. 5(b) shows the task allocation result of MSensing. As can be seen, only the sensing tasks in the popular areas are completed (marked as 4/3/2/1 completed sensing tasks) and there is no participant completing the sensing tasks in the unpopular areas (marked as 0 completed sensing tasks). There are 118 completed sensing tasks and 59 winning participants. The task completion ratio and the participant winning ratio are 118 400 = 29.5% and 59 300 = 19.7%, respectively. Fig. 5(c) shows the task allocation result of our movement-based incentive mechanism. As can be seen, more participants win in the auction and more sensing tasks are completed. There are 280 completed sensing tasks and 142 winning participants. The task completion ratio and the participant winning ratio are 70% and 47.3%, respectively.
Compared with MSensing, our mechanism achieves better performance in terms of the task completion ratio and the participant winning ratio. The reason is as follows. Most of the participants are clustered in the popular areas, and many of them may lose in the auction by using MSening, and many tasks in the unpopular areas cannot be completed due to the lack of participants. The movement-based incentive mechanism motivates the participants to move to the unpopular areas and complete the sensing tasks there. Thus, our mechanism performs better.
C. Performance Comparisons
We conduct extensive simulations in three different scenarios, where the standard deviations of participants' X-coordinates are set to σ = 10 m, σ = 20 m, and σ = 30 m, respectively. In this subsection, we present the performance comparisons between our mechanism and MSensing under various simulation parameters.
1) Number of Participants: Fig. 6 shows how the number of participant (n) affects the performance. Generally speaking, the task completion ratio and the social welfare increase when n increases, as shown in Fig. 6(a) and (c) . This is because more sensing tasks can be completed and higher social welfare can be achieved with more participants.
Our mechanism outperforms MSensing in terms of the task completion ratio, the participant winning ratio, and the social welfare. And the performance improvement is larger when there are more participants. For example, with n = 150 and σ = 10, compared with MSensing, our mechanism increases the task completion ratio by 100%, the participant winning ratio by 66.6%, and the social welfare by 63%. When n = 300 and σ = 10, compared with MSensing, our mechanism increases the task completion ratio by 145.4%, the participant winning ratio by 143.3%, and the social welfare by 146.7%. The reason is as follows. In our mechanism, the platform leverages the movement-based incentive to stimulate participants to move to the unpopular areas and complete the sensing tasks in these areas. For MSensing, many of the participants are clustered in the popular areas and will lose in the auction. Thus, our incentive mechanism performs better.
The performance improvement of our mechanism is much larger when the concentration of participants is higher. For example, when n = 300, compared with MSensing, our mechanism can increase the task completion ratio by 146.7% with σ = 10, 45.2% with σ = 20, and 26% with σ = 30, as shown in Fig. 6(a) . A similar trend can be seen in Fig. 6(b) and (c). This is because when more participants are clustered in the popular areas, more participants will lose auction in MSensing.
2) Upper Bound of the Moving Distance (δ): Fig. 7 shows how the moving distance upper bound δ affects the performance. As can be seen, when δ increases, the performance of our mechanism can be significantly improved compared with MSensing in terms of all three metrics. This is because if δ is bigger, the platform can motivate participants to move to wider unpopular areas and complete more sensing tasks. We can also see that the effect of δ is more significant when σ is small.
3) Moving Cost: Fig. 8 shows how the parameter η in the moving cost function affects the performance. As can be seen, when η increases, the performance of MSensing remains generally stable and the performance of our mechanism drops. The reason is as follows: With larger η, the cost for moving becomes larger. Then, more participants cannot win in the auction, as shown in Fig. 8(b) , and more sensing tasks cannot be completed, as shown in Fig. 8(a) . Therefore, the social welfare decreases, as shown in Fig. 8(c) . As shown in the figures, even in the worst case (η = 0.04), our mechanism still outperforms MSensing in terms of all three metrics.
Summary of simulation results:
The simulation results show that the movement-based incentive mechanism outperforms MSensing in terms of the task completion ratio, the participant winning ratio, and the social welfare. Both the platform and the participants can benefit from the movement-based incentive. From the platform perspective, it achieves enlarged sensing task coverage by motivating the participants in the popular areas to move to the unpopular areas. From the participants' perspective, more participants win in auction and get remuneration.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we designed movement-based incentive for crowdsourcing, where participants are stimulated to move under the instructions from the platform so as to benefit both participants and the platform. We formulated a task allocation problem considering controlled mobility and proposed a greedy algorithm to solve it. We also designed a critical payment policy to guarantee that participants declare their cost truthfully. Theoretical analysis shows that our proposed incentive mechanism satisfies the desired properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, platform profitability, and computational efficiency. Evaluation results show that the proposed movement-based incentive mechanism outperforms the existing solution in terms of the task completion ratio, the participant winning ratio, and the social welfare.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design the general movement-based monetary incentive for crowdsourcing applications. As the initial work, we do not expect to solve all the problems. In the future, we will consider more practical moving cost functions and study how such a cost function affects the incentive mechanism design.
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